5.1 Trends in satellite support to naval operations
The end of the Cold War and the experience of DESERT STORM have had a profound impact on the DOD and national space communities. The end of the Cold War left organizations such as the NRO and NSA (even the CIA), who justified their budgets previously in terms of national strategic imperatives, scrambling for funding. These organizations are now focusing on "support to military operations" as the keystone of their long-term fiscal survival. Similarly, criticism of the poor availability, quality, and timeliness of support provided to U.S. forces in DESERT STORM by the national intelligence community has elevated support for military operations to the highest priority. It might be expected that "space support for the warfighter" (a U.S. Space Command phrase) should be expanding at an accelerated late. This expectation is, however, only partially true-for a number of interesting reasons.
The DESERT STORM perceptions were a reflection for the most part on the poor collection management, communications, and data handling capabilities of the fighting forces, rather than a shortfall in space-based collection capabilities. The Navy has addressed DESERT STORM limitations in several important ways:
-The Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS) has evolved from a variety of afloat data processing concepts and represents a tightly integrated network of capabilities for managing and manipulating information.
-The Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS), a "hobby shop" effort that has evolved into a joint program, is found on all aircraft carriers, large amphibious ships, and fleet flagships. JDISS provides rapid access, via SHF satellite communications, to the tactical databases of theater and national intelligence centers.
5.2 Trends in satellite technology for tactical support
The budget downturn that has affected all of the Department of Defense has had an impact on satellite systems as well. The following paragraphs provide brief summaries of the decisions made during the early 1990s concerning future satellite systems.
5.2.1 Communications
For the foreseeable future, the fleet will have access to UHF, SHE and limited EHF service between 70 degrees North and 70 degrees South latitude (see figure 20). Polar (i.e., Arctic) coverage will depend on the progress of the Milstar program which has been slow to mature but seems likely to survive the budget axe.
5.2.2 Navigation
The Transit navigation satellite system is no longer operational. The Global Positioning System is the sole U.S. navigation satellite system for civil and military use.
5.2.3 Environmental sensing
The Navy has no service-unique meteorological or oceanographic satellite programs planned, beyond contributing sensors to other programs from time to time.
5.3 Future roles and missions in space
The Navy depends more on satellites and satellite-derived information as part of day-today operations than the other services. Since the mid-1980s, however, the Navy has been content to let other services and organizations spend their money on space systems the Navy can then exploit As a short term strategy in a fiscally-constrained environment this philosophy has some merit. As this document has described, however, the Navy's influence as a source of significant innovation in the U.S. military space program is waning. The fiscal pressures that are driving the Navy to a three-hundred (and perhaps a two-hundred) ship Navy are also reducing Navy competence in the development and operation of satellite systems, almost to the point of extinction.
The Navy manages to retain some leverage in military space activities in several important ways:
The Navy has, for most of the four decades of the space age, succeeded in leveraging heavy U.S. investments in national and DOD satellite systems by combining four elements in consistently innovative ways:
Post-Cold War Navy activities with respect to space do not indicate any diminishing of emphasis on the first two factors. It is, however, impossible to "leverage" without the second two as well.